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RICHARD EDES HARRISON AND THE CARTOGRAPHIC
PERSPECTIVE OF MODERN INTERNATIONALISM
TIMOTHY BARNEY

Air-age globalism was a discursive phenomenon throughout the development
of World War II that accounted for the rapid “shrinking” of the world through
air technologies and the internationalization of American interests. Cartography became air-age globalism’s primary popular expression, and journalistic cartographers such as Richard Edes Harrison at Fortune magazine
introduced new mapping projections and perspectives in response to these
global changes. This essay argues that Harrison’s mapping innovations mediate a geopolitical shift in America toward a modern, image-based internationalism. Through recastings of “vision” and “strategy,” Harrison’s work
offers an opportunity to assess the rhetorical tensions between idealism and
realism in midcentury cartographic forms and the larger spatial and perceptual challenges facing U.S. foreign policy during its rise to superpower status.

T

hroughout the course of the 1930s and into the global and catastrophic conflict of the Second World War, cartography, like the
business of war itself, took to the air. As fıghter planes traversed the
earth and spread their wingspans and weaponry, mapmakers were devising
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a bird’s-eye view of the world, actively changing the ways we viewed the
globe and our placement in it. Americans became enamored with a new
air-age global perspective. And from this vantage point, the world was now
closer—an exciting and frightening prospect. In his fıreside chat on February 23, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke of the momentous
political implications of a bold new perspective in geopolitics:
Those Americans who believed that we could live under the illusion of
isolationism wanted the American eagle to imitate the tactics of the ostrich.
Now, many of those same people, afraid that we may be sticking our necks
out, want our national bird to be turned into a turtle. But we prefer to retain
the eagle as it is–flying high and striking hard.1

Underscoring this rhetorical move, FDR’s press secretary Stephen T. Early
sent statements to national newspapers a week before the chat, requesting
that Americans bring their maps and globes with them as they sat and
listened to their president’s next war update, “so that they might clearly and,
in that way, much better understand him as he talks with them.”2 Directly
appealing to armchair cartographers, FDR instructed, “This war is a new
kind of war. It is different from all other wars of the past, not only in its
methods and weapons, but also in its geography. . . . Look at your map.”3
The new geopolitics dictated that the oceans no longer protected us from
our moral duty; the new cartographic measurement would become minutes, not miles. As Walter Ristow wrote in 1944, “All geography becomes
home geography when the most distant point on earth is less than sixty
hours from your local airport.”4 This discourse of the air was reflected in the
move toward popular, journalistic cartography during WWII—maps and
globes came off the walls and desks of academics and defense bureaucrats
and into American homes in unprecedented ways.
Popular cartographer Richard Edes Harrison played a central role in
challenging cartographic perspectives and attempting to change spatial
thinking on the everyday level during America’s rise to superpower status.5
As house cartographer for Fortune and consultant for Life magazine, among
other publications, for almost two decades, Harrison inhabited the “geographic imagination” of FDR’s fıreside culture.6 Cartographic perspective
and projection became his two innovative modes of communication; his
most famous maps revived long-forgotten modes of projection that, instead
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of establishing Europe as the center of the world, anchored maps around the
Arctic, changing our entire spatial perception of proximity. Other maps
dispensed with the “North on top, South on bottom” viewpoint, placing his
readers instead at “a vantage point high above the earth so that the distances
draw together in perspective, as they might to an incredibly farsighted man
poised at an altitude of many thousand miles.”7
Susan Schulten’s work positions Harrison as a key fıgure in the debates of
the second half of the twentieth century that discuss geography and cartography as a discursive phenomenon.8 Over the last two decades in particular,
a critical geography has emerged, wherein maps become implicated as
iconic renderings of ideology and political power, as rhetorical constructions with their own kind of visual grammar. Well before this movement,
Harrison seemed acutely aware of the discursive function of his trade,
chiding his fıeld for being rigid and precise to a fault, and calling for an
acceptance of “art as a full partner of technology in the design and drafting
of maps.”9 Harrison’s dogged amateurism evidenced his realization that
maps were part of a cultural dialogue, rather than simply a top-down
presentation of elite, scientifıc objectives. In defıning cartography as “the
diffıcult art of trying to represent the impossible,” Harrison accentuated the
role of rhetoric in advancing political agendas in maps.10
This essay seeks to examine this crossroads between the Harrisonian
frame of “maps as discourse” and the immense spatial changes that faced
American rhetoric in the mid-twentieth century air-age. I argue that Harrison’s maps mediate a historical shift in American foreign policy and
spatial worldview from classic principles of political realism (with its emphasis on geopolitically defıned states and concrete balances of power)
toward a more fluid, abstract, and image-based internationalism.11 As
Frank Ninkovich writes, “Interests, formerly ‘hard,’ material, and national,
became by this new standard soft, symbolic, and international.”12 Thus, in
Ninkovich’s estimation, “interpretation” became the center of focus, with
strategists coming to “‘read’ the international environment as if it was a
text,” and global order needing to be imagined and argued into being, not
simply achieved through a “mastery of objective details.”13
Harrison’s air-age aesthetic is an important part of this new interpretative paradigm, eschewing the “truths” of classical power politics and balance
of interests, and positing new relationships and proximities. Particularly in
their transformation of perspective and projection, Harrison’s maps project
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to a flat page the anxieties and opportunities that are part of a global liberal
modernism. Understanding these new high vantage viewpoints can be
aided by a critical reading of Harrison’s actual maps. Although his contributions to air-age globalism and the popular “geographic imagination”
have been excellently documented elsewhere, Harrison’s work as a system
of visual rhetoric deserves further examination.14 It is not simply that his
maps reflect global changes in this period, but also that the very act of
mapping new perspectives and experimenting with cartographic perception helps create the interpretative ground by which the globe can be read
and written by strategists. Harrison remains a vital case, in particular, to
rhetorical scholars not simply because he helped broaden the geographic
imagination and allowed America to “look at the world” in a new way, but
because he called attention to the discursive nature of space itself, in a
historical moment of a global war when the world’s very textuality was
foregrounded. Harrison’s arguments for flexibility in perspective and projection accentuated cartography’s malleability and contributed to the powerful ideology that the world can be molded through the symbolic image. In
the process, Harrison’s rhetoric buttressed the liberal narrative of international space and encouraged the type of visual abstraction necessary for
American national interests to be cast as universal.
This essay, then, makes the rhetorical dimensions of form and content
central to the analysis. On one hand, the content of Harrison’s WWII maps
presents particular spatial problems that can be used to frame solutions,
with the map itself becoming a strategic resource—war can be waged
successfully if one “sees” correctly. Yet, at the same time, the form of the
map is dramatically emphasized, with the novelty of perspective and projection itself a main feature of the map. Thus, the map’s status as strategic
means is brought to the forefront. Every new perceptual angle and strange
projection could spatially reveal a new strategic relationship, and thus,
notions of constantly shifting visual perception, adaptation, and vigilance
are implied as intrinsic to strategy. This development would have obvious
repercussions on the character of America’s new internationalism during
WWII and into the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis notes that the tension
between means and ends required constant negotiation for post-war strategists, and it was often the perception of power and strength that determined strategy, rather than what could actually be measured.15 In
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Harrison’s case, we see the form of perception as a central part of the
rhetorical display.
I begin with a brief discussion of this interpretative internationalism
through the lens of air-age globalism, both in terms of key contextual
changes in the discipline of geography and international relations, and its
visual manifestation in maps. Next, I analyze a series of representative
Harrisonian maps, particularly those seen in his “Atlas for U.S. Citizen”
supplement in the September 1940 issue of Fortune and those published in
his best-selling Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy
(1944), among others found in his archive. The critique of these maps
focuses on Harrison’s approach to perspective and projection and its bearing on two major themes: (1) the interplay of seeing and vision on the
cartographic page, with a focus on how the maps simultaneously conceal
and reveal the alternative possibilities inherent in a rhetoric of display; and
(2) how the maps both uphold and challenge notions of what “strategy”
means in a new air-age context, re-envisioning borders and proximities,
and reflecting an uneasy globalism where goods, information, and peoples
are continually in flux. Throughout, the rhetorical tensions of form and
content illuminate Harrison’s emphasis on the rhetorical flexibility of cartography itself and its connection to America’s developing global strategy.

THE TENETS AND TENSIONS OF THE AIR-AGE SHIFT TO GLOBAL
INTERNATIONALISM
In 1944, Ristow conceived of eight principles for the new air-age geography. Most important is the fırst tenet that “Air Age geography is global
geography.”16 With long-range aircraft and the multitude of state interests involved in the ongoing war, the traditional focus on regional
geography had to be supplemented with world-minded surveys of the
globe.17 The second tenet is that “Geography is not a static science,”18
which reflects Harrison’s view that perspectives and worldviews need to
be changed and continually questioned. Thirdly, “Air Age distance is
measured by time rather than space,”19 where “there are no longer any
far corners of the earth” and space is measured in minutes and hours
rather than miles.20 A fourth tenet is that “Transport by air discounts
geographical barriers” as borders become more irrelevant in terms of
movement and occupation of space.21 Many air-age maps, for example,
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eschew borders, sticking to the topography of rolling mountains and
basins, leaving out political boundaries and highlighting the fluidity of
continental land.22 The fıfth tenet is the idea that “The world is not
divided into hemispheres.”23 Air-age geography makes hemispheres
obsolete—America is now seen as closer in proximity to the “Eastern
hemisphere” of Eurasia than to Latin America, thus, questioning conceptions central to U.S. foreign policy since the Monroe Doctrine.
Relatedly, the sixth tenet is that “World transportation routes are no
longer restricted to east–west lines”—the seafaring mind of the Mercator projection accentuated geographical imaginaries of east and west,
but in the air, travel from a given place was possible in all directions on
a spherical earth.24 Finally, Ristow’s seventh and eighth tenets are also
interrelated, positing that “Ocean basin geography is out of date” and
that there is a “New signifıcance of weather and climate in the Air
Age.”25 The centrality of ocean basins like the Mediterranean or the
Caribbean are thus challenged, while the barriers of desert and ice no
longer seal off access to important parts of the world.26
Texts such as Ristow’s hint at a kind of idealism in the new air-age
geography, as if one could somehow fly away from borders, nationalism,
and war machines; yet, the shift to globalism in practice was less about
transcending such concerns and more about re-envisioning them. Geographer Neil Smith reminds us that these twentieth century shifts are not a
triumph over geography, despite some of the air-age rhetoric, but are, in
fact, intensely geographical. Smith points to a crucial reconception of space,
concurrent with the new perspectives from the air, where absolute geography (seeing spaces as having a pre-existing identity with the common sense
notion that space “is”) shifts to a relational geography where distance is
relative, and space is constituted socially.27 In discussing the elevation of
aviation-aided science in this era, Stephen Bocking has noted the power of
“synoptic vision” in aiding the state’s interpretation of these new relationships, a vision “rendering territory legible and thus amenable to order.”28
The act of seeing global space is key here, opening up the world to interdependences that require constant, vigilant management.29
In this new relational framework, transportation fluidly connects capital
and communication networks and challenges the realist power politics that
had established the nation-state as the key political unit.30 In geopolitical
terms, realism posits that, rather than human agency and will, “it was the
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natural environment and the geographical setting of a state which exercised
the greatest influence on its destiny.”31 In the kind of classic realist geopolitics of Halford Mackinder, for example, maps rigidly contain the balance of
power within their borders and help to codify the power of nation-states,
but are often seen as natural evidence of power, rather than shapers of that
power. Air-age perspectives, thus, signal a key change: geographers no
longer have to travel the land and describe its contours; the power of the
airplane challenges such expertise, privileging the technological means by
which the perspective is obtained. Thus, the perspective of those with access
to such technologies is also privileged, giving a new power to liberal government strategists’ reading of the world. Geography is advancing beyond
the thorough regional description prized by titans of the fıeld, such as
Richard Hartshorne, and becomes much more politicized in the process.32
The sense of travel and movement through technological mastery of the air
comes to serve in this era as a synecdoche for the kind of movement of ideas
and capital that could be seemingly limitless in the unprecedented fusion of
state and science.
As Ninkovich has noted, American statesmen, during this shift to an
interpretative kind of internationalism, suffered a condition “which was the
opposite of dyslexia: incoherence inhered in the text rather than in the
minds of the readers.”33 The rhetorical world of air-age globalism fıt this
condition: it did not mean changing the liberal modernist approach to
progress, it meant fınding new ways to perceive where that incoherence was,
in this case from a vantage point high above the earth. If the globe was seen
textually rather than as some fıxed entity, it could be molded and approached in different ways. Neglecting the balance of ends and means in the
old geopolitical realism for a sharper focus on “credibility” meant that there
would be constant attempts to get a more credible perception of world
events.34 Realism was not abandoned by any means, but it was transformed
and made much more nuanced. In Gaddis’s terms, a new universalism of
American interests vied against the particularism of past foreign policy,
forming an essential tension of post-WWII strategy.35
In addition, the traditional realist dichotomy between domestic life and
international relations was breaking down; the values of everyday life at
home were becoming more synonymous with notions of international
community.36 Harrison’s boss at Fortune, Henry Luce, is an integral exemplar of this complex movement to liberal internationalism. In his famous
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articulation of the American Century in 1941, for example, Luce articulated
globalism as a pursuit both of economic interests and “world opinion,” both
of which publications like Time and Fortune would attempt to cultivate.37
Pronouncing that “our world . . . is one world, fundamentally indivisible,”
Luce saw America as the responsible steward for maintaining such a rolling,
unifıed space.38 The realist isolationism of American cant was still seen as
having a hold on the culture, even if it had been eroding since at least the
turn of the century, and Luce and his cartographers-for-hire, such as Harrison, were making conscious attempts to break through such seeming
nearsightedness.
Air transportation itself became the new dividing border, then, pitting
those who would use the new power for its supposed benefıcial potential—
free trade, free movement, free government—against those who would use
it for “evil,” including the empire-mad armies of Germany and other Axis
powers. Thus, the unfolding international space of the air-age was both a
site of liberal hopes for modern progress and immense anxiety at the new
proximities suggested by the power of mediated images from a plane. In the
introduction to the classic 1943 geopolitics text The Compass of the World
(featuring maps by Harrison), Archibald MacLeish, the poet and former
Fortune editor, wrote of both the awe and responsibility of the new air-age
globalism:
Neither mastery of the air nor power in the air nor the airmen’s global image
of the earth can make, alone, the world we hope to live in. . . . Nevertheless we
know, all of us, the power of images in our lives and in the lives of nations. We
know that those who think their world a free place of free movement, of free
commerce both in men and words, are already free men, whatever limitations
are put upon their freedom by brutality or force. . . . Men have mastered the
air. And the question now . . . on which this terrible war is fought—
is . . . whether the air will be an instrument of freedom such as men have
never dared to dream of or . . . an instrument of slavery by which a single
nation can enslave the earth . . . without the hope or possibility of rebellion
and revolt.39

The air-age’s image-based values became, then, a rhetorical crossroads of
national destiny—a moral choice between a path of good and a path of evil,
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with air power now “considered essential not only to the security of the
United States but to world peace.”40

ANALYZING THE PERSPECTIVE AND PROJECTION OF
HARRISONIAN MAPS
Richard Edes Harrison’s cartography represents an explosive example of
how form and content in maps fuse together, complicating that sense of
detachment above the earth, and evidencing how air-age perspectives can
house the kind of new abstractions that supported emerging, midcentury
liberal internationalist values. This section critically examines a series of
popular, journalistic Harrison maps from the WWII era, specifıcally in
terms of how their uses of perspective and projection negotiate the dynamics of vision and seeing during the shift to internationalism, and represent
tensions around changing values of American global strategy.41
The ubiquity of news maps today is taken largely for granted; Monmonier points out that newspapers and news magazines “are the prime
gatekeepers in communicating facts of location and place . . . potentially
able to deliver when appropriate the maps needed to understand or interpret important world, national, and local events.”42 Yet, during Harrison’s
ascent to popular prominence, these gates were just being constructed, and
without a signifıcant history of news cartography in American culture,
cartographers like Harrison had a wide range of freedom in their design and
iconography.43 More important than complete scientifıc accuracy was the
map’s ability to support and complement the story it accompanied. To
reach a mass audience, Harrison and other up-and-coming news cartographers sought to simplify spatial information and unburden it from the yoke
of academic and elite control.44 Such work brought a sense of the globe into
the home so that “Americans imagine and comprehend a world that most
[do] not experience fırsthand.”45 Harrison himself reflected, “It is among
the weekly and monthly magazines . . . that the greatest assault on tradition
has been made. . . . they have borne the burden of making the public conscious of global geography.”46
These assaults on tradition in Harrison’s meticulous production techniques can be found in two notable contributions to the air-age cartographic lexicon: new perspectives that place the map user in the role of pilot,
and a deliberate crusade to supplant the unstoppable Mercator projection
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with a host of other, more novel projections.47 Life’s profıle of the Fortune
atlas provides a fascinating account of Harrison’s process behind the “perspective map,” which plays with dimension to make the globe appear as if it
is coming off the page.48 He begins with a small freehand sketch of the
portion of the globe to be included, and then photographs the globe from a
distance of six feet (placing the mapmaker at a theoretical altitude of almost
40,000 miles over the Atlantic Ocean).49 Harrison then chooses a greatly
enlarged, close-up of the area produced from the photograph, which provides the basis of his vividly detailed sketches, out of which he produces his
trademark three-dimensional sense of the reader flying over mountainous
terrain.50 These techniques in and of themselves were not innovative—yet,
it was the sense of movement and extreme angles that evidenced Harrison’s
particular ability to help “redevelop a native freshness of perception.”51
“Projection” refers to the choice of focus or center of the map. In more
technical terms, according to Monmonier, projections “transform the
curved, three-dimensional surface of the planet into a flat, two-dimensional
plane” and anchor the focus of the reader’s eye.52 In choosing polar centers,
for example, or by showing a round globe on the flat page, these projections
become a salient rhetorical choice—the selection of a particular center on a
map has political ramifıcations with regard to the message disseminated to
readers and users of the atlas; all other points and lines on the map flow from
that origin point.53
A representative map by Harrison from his Look at the World atlas is
worth extended description. “Europe from the East” (fıg. 1) is perhaps one
of Harrison’s most striking and simple maps in the atlas. The map covers a
full two-page spread and is unadorned by any legends or captions, save its
title. The image is typical of Harrison’s “perspective maps,” thus showing
the reader a rolling, rounded sliver of the globe, with three-dimensional
accents to connote flying over the topography of Europe. What is remarkable about this perspective, though, is that it centers on Eastern Europe from
the viewpoint of an imposing Soviet Union.54 The very center of the map
rests in Poland. Moscow is dotted at the bottom center of the map, and the
entire European continent appears to flow out of it. At the top of the map is
Spain, with the Atlantic Ocean on the horizon, and in the northeast the start
of North Africa through Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria is spotted at the edges.
One’s fırst reaction, perhaps, is to see the Cold War ramifıcations of Harrison’s framing: it is easy to take on a Soviet-eye view of an Eastern Europe for
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Fig. 1. Richard Edes Harrison, “Europe From the East,” Look at the World:
The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy, 1944 (Reprinted with permission from
the Estate of Richard Edes Harrison)

the taking, unfolding almost naturally before a great expanding power all
the way to the Atlantic. In the corner above the perspective map, in the
margins of the white space, is an inset of an orthographic projection depicting the whole globe, highlighting in red the slice of Europe and North Africa
that is the subject of the larger map.55
Yet, perhaps more important to the central argument of this essay is the
very subversion of rhetorical form in the map as part of the WWII context;
a simple cartographic reorientation such as this one suggests how brittle the
perception of WWII alliances with the Soviet Union were, and how a simple
change in spatial perspective could reveal new relationships.56 Harrison’s
map resonates with these conceptions of an uneasy partnership between the
two emerging superpowers. During the early days of America’s involvement in World War II, for example, Sir Halford Mackinder’s theories that
the Soviet control of the “Heartland” (namely, Eastern Europe) was a
potentially explosive strategic problem reached notoriety in academic, popular, and foreign policy circles. In a piece for Foreign Affairs in 1943, he
concluded that “if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of
Germany, she must rank as the greatest land Power on the globe. . . . The
Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth. For the fırst time in
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history it is manned by a garrison suffıcient both in number and quality.”57
In addition, Walter Lippmann’s influential bestseller U.S. Foreign Policy:
Shield of the Republic from 1943 was passed around and praised by key
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as important reading for both wartime
foreign policy and post-war planning, with Lippmann warning that once
America and the Soviet Union lose their common enemies in Germany and
Japan, “Russian-American relations will no longer be controlled by the
historic fact that each is for the other a potential friend in the rear of its
enemies. Russia will, on the contrary, be the greatest power in the rear of our
indispensable friends.”58
Harrison’s rendering of “Europe From the East,” then, entered a discursive air-age culture in America that was sensitive to the relationship between nation-space and perception. Typically, maps of the Heartland,
including Mackinder’s own famous maps, would be indicated on conventional projections and with a standard, almost omniscient perspective.
Harrison’s map, however, is rhetorically selective in offering the Soviet
vantage point, thus leaving American viewers potentially vulnerable. That
elimination of a so-called objective and detached view of the world suggests
a potential anxiety for U.S. foreign policy; with perspectives like these, a
Soviet stronghold in Eastern Europe is made to look easy.
In the process, the very power of maps as strategic tools becomes part of
the subject of the map itself. The strategy of the air-age necessitates the
flexibility of vision, and Harrison’s map promotes the value of perceptual
adaptation, with the discursive nature of world space brought to the forefront. The lack of captions or any linguistic description (aside from place
names) challenges the viewer to see this novel perspective as inevitable and
self-evident, a kind of common sense geographical depiction that requires
no explanation for the discerning viewer.59 In addition, having the global
inset in the corner reminds the viewer of the connection of the region to the
globe itself—that what takes place in one sliver of the world is just one piece
of myriad strategic spatial relationships and proximities that Americans are
faced with in the new era of air transportation. Such a map, then, represents
the contours of the air-age’s material contributions to the evolving liberalmodern internationalism—the turn to the symbolic and interpretative in
world affairs that globalized security and charted national interests on an
international scale. “Europe from the East” is but one striking example of
this, and thus, we now turn to a deeper engagement with Harrison’s maps to
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characterize the key visual-rhetorical dimensions of cartography in this
tumultuous shift.

SITUATING “VISION” IN HARRISONIAN MAPS
The very title of Harrison’s most famous and bestselling collection indicates
the new premium during the air-age era on the value of vision and visibility
itself: “Look at the World” is an imperative for clearheaded perception of
new supposed realities. This plea to readers is not insignifıcant to a rhetorical reading of the maps contained inside: maps are bound up in complex
rhetorics of truth and transparency, as vehicles of both art and science, fact
and value. Lawrence Prelli notes that “displays manifest through . . . specifıc, situated, rhetorical resolutions of the dynamic between concealing and
revealing. And such rhetorical resolutions exhibit partial perspectives—an
orientation, a point of view, a way of seeing—that both open and restrict
possibilities for meaning for those who become audience to them.”60 Thus,
the act of spectatorship itself can be problematized; the method of seeing
transfers a set of values, with images “always situated in complex circumstances of viewing, interpreting, and consuming.”61
Harrison’s conscious subversion of cartographic form shows an implicit
engagement with these rhetorical dimensions of visual mediation, but also
contends with the historic role of maps as unmediated frames for reality.
The map “Eight Views of the World” (fıg. 2) puts these conundrums on
visual display.62 Harrison often uses the orthographic projection throughout Look at the World. Air-age globalism appeared truly “global” on the
orthographic maps, as this type of map attempted to represent in two
dimensions the benefıts of the average desk globe.63 Unlike perspective
maps, which tried to represent the sphericity of the earth in regional
fragments, orthographic views portrayed the totality of a freely rotating
globe. Yet, the novelty of “Eight Views” is that there are indeed eight
different projections over the two-page spread; the reader contends with
eight globes, all centering and highlighting different areas of the world. In
the fırst globe, we see a centered United States, with the tag line “The U.S.: its
geographical isolation is more seeming than real,” as Harrison’s view is
situated so that all continents can be seen in relation to America.64 The
United States is highlighted in bright red on each of the eight maps, to
amplify its connection to the other continents of the world. Another of the
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Fig. 2. Richard Edes Harrison, “Eight Views of the World,” Look at the
World: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy, 1944 (Reprinted with permission from the Estate of Richard Edes Harrison)

eight maps shows Antarctica at the north of the globe, with a sharp, orange
Argentina protruding toward it, complete with a caption reading, “Argentina: a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.”65 Europe’s orthographic
projection shows the tiny peninsula dwarfed and sandwiched by Asia to its
left and Africa to its right, with a caption stating the visually obvious,
“Europe: more close neighbors than any other continent.”66
Prelli’s work on maps has emphasized the immediacy of a map’s rhetorical taxis, in that it provides a particular arrangement of space that constrains the viewer.67 In “Eight Views,” the total arrangement of these eight
maps connotes an active, rotating, and often vulnerable earth, as if the worth
of all parts of the world simply depends on the perspective (and interests) of
the map user. Harrison could have perhaps provided the reader with one
world map highlighting all of these relationships, but by choosing to place
eight different views in succession, the rhetorical nature of space becomes
integral to the form of presentation. Like the desk globe at home, Harrison
allows users to flip around and choose their focus, and implicitly argues that
no matter which way one looks at it, the “one world” is entangled with
relationships in all directions, with isolationism easily disputed by the
“spin” of the globe.68 Harrison’s choice to use the globe itself inside the
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conventions of a flat map is key. As Denis Cosgrove writes on the complex
genealogy of the “globe” in the Western imagination: “On a flat map the
known can be extended to the very edges of representational space, leaving
implicit the question of what lies beyond the frame; on the globe the “ends of
the earth” cannot be ignored.”69 Thus, what were former peripheries become potential centers, marking a key shift in the idea of vision in the
Harrison approach.
This notion of visual arrangement, of course, recalls Harrison’s particular focus on audience. His emphasis on flexibility seemingly puts the audience in charge of, but also implicated in, the “reading,” placing the user right
into the pilot’s seat. But the reader also gets to assume a variety of personas
in these perspectives. In a 1942 issue of Fortune, for example, Harrison
contributed a map entitled, “Southeast to Armageddon,” in which the
viewer is imbued with a “Hitler’s-eye view” of the Middle East and beyond
from a point high above Berchtesgaden.70 The map, in its content, connotes
a sense of the diffıculty the Nazis would face geographically in an attack on
Asia Minor; but in highlighting form at the same time, users get the sense
that they can inhabit the spatial worldview of the “enemy” through the
function of the map itself. Similarly, a 1943 Fortune map entitled “The
Not-So-Soft Underside” (fıg. 3) places the viewer in perspective from a
point over North Africa, looking at the “underbelly” of Europe from the
Mediterranean.71 As Harrison points out in a small note accompanying this
map, “The view was selected to undermine Churchill’s insistence that
Europe had to be attacked in its ‘soft underbelly.’ My working title for this
map was ‘How soft is the Belly?’ The weasel-worded printed title was the
selection of the editors.”72 So, in taking on Churchill’s claims of strength in
attacking Germany from North Africa and accusing the Allies of misunderstanding basic geography, Harrison makes the case that the angle of vision
given to the user can be used to dispute the “truths” of powerful strategists;
cartographic perspective becomes a kind of strategic argument in itself.
In both of the aforementioned examples, users can assume the role of
either enemy or ally from the air. In the process, each map makes a pointed
argument about strategy in the spatial content, while evidencing the malleability of form in a medium often noted for its rigidity. As Harrison admits
in Look at the World, most maps are seen as architects’ blueprints, and give
the reader an infınite viewpoint where “one is not over a particular point on
the map, one is over all points simultaneously.”73 However, Harrison’s
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Fig. 3. Richard Edes Harrison, “The Not-So-Soft Underside,” Fortune, 1943
(Geography & Map Division, Richard Edes Harrison Collection, Library of
Congress; reprinted with permission from the Estate of Richard Edes
Harrison)

perspective maps foreground selectivity and partiality; in the same introduction, he notes of talking with pilots of the Eighth Air Force in Europe
about their experiences: “A conventional map, they complained, only looks
right when you are directly above the objective, i.e., some time after release
of the bombs. The problem was solved by making maps with a fınite
viewpoint that shows the objective from the normal angle and height of
approach. The new maps coincided with a true view of the target.”74
Harrison, then, sought to immerse popular audiences within partial worldviews, and his fıxation on audience engagement reflected the new internationalism’s focus on world opinion and flexible, global communication for
which opinion-shapers like Luce were boldly calling. His perspectives place
the audience into dialogue with the cartographer, indicative of an awareness
of space being constituted socially, rather than as the “givens” of power
politics.
Of course, Harrison’s quotation about the “true view of the target” speaks
to his complex engagement with truth and transparency in maps. This
complexity stems in part from the contextual framework by which Harrison
was operating. Harrison was immersed in a journalistic visual culture where
maps were designed to order for war problems that were unfolding daily,
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Fig. 4. Richard Edes Harrison, “Great Circle Airways,” Look at the World:
The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy, 1944 (Reprinted with permission from
the Estate of Richard Edes Harrison)

and thus were judged by their ability to provide a window into a particular
strategic issue, rather than their focus on fact. As an editor revealingly notes
to Harrison on one of the tracing sheets found in the archive for his July
1941 map of the U.S.S.R. in Fortune: “don’t be too mathematical about
centering it.”75 Yet, at the very same time this journalistic paradigm was
fırmly in place, many of Harrison’s fellow colleagues in the disciplines of
geography and cartography were being drafted by the OSS to produce a
monumental amount of spatial data, in what would eventually become a
quantitative revolution in geography.76 This revolution sought to produce
clear, reliable spatial facts for America’s war strategy, and in many ways was
a pointed reaction to what was perceived as the deliberate distortion of
geography for the ends of strength and power by the Third Reich.77
Harrison’s own approach to distortion is caught in a peculiar nexus
between the propagandistic, German-style geopolitics and the kind of selfconscious military-academic apparatus of spatial science that emerged from
WWII. For example, Look at the World maps such as “Great Circle Airways”
(fıg. 4) feature a north polar gnomonic projection, with Harrison centering
on the North Pole at the expense of dramatically distorting the shapes and
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areas of lands lying on the outer reaches of the map, with Mexico in
particular looking like long underwear hung out to dry.78 Another polarcentered map in the atlas, “Arctic Arena,” uses the full-globe orthographic
projection, distorting the familiar shapes of continents and placing the
U.S.S.R. and Europe north of the United States to illustrate the new
proximities that air routes over the North Pole bring to life.79 These
novelty maps are certainly not the types of sketches that would be found in
the halls of the Department of State during the war. But these uses of
distortion are deliberately designed to challenge the “common sense” viewpoint of the Euro-centric and East–West minded Mercator map, whose own
distortions, Harrison believed, became a misleading “truth” about the way
the world was supposed to be viewed.80 In Harrison’s introduction to the
atlas, for example, he attacks Nazi Germany’s leading geographer, Karl
Haushofer, for his almost exclusive reliance on Mercator.81 Yet, interestingly enough, Harrison was not attacking German maps for their lack of
accuracy or for promoting a propagandistic viewpoint, but for their lack of
flexibility; and this is a key distinction. For Harrison, Germany’s cartographic crime was not the manipulation of geographic “truths,” but a failure
of vision itself.
Harrison was concerned about what S. W. Boggs, the State Department’s
geographer of the early 1940s, called “cartohypnosis,” where the audience
“exhibits a high degree of suggestibility in respect to stimuli aroused by the
map.”82 Harrison’s answer was simply to give users a bevy of tools at their
eyes and fıngers, with his own new perspectives just one in a series of
possible views. Writing in the Saturday Review, Harrison noted that “American geography and cartography are exhibiting growing pains. They are
emerging not from infancy but from a static condition bordering on senility.”83 And later in Surveying and Mapping, he observed: “in the military
agencies, I keep hearing the words ‘user requirements’ over and over again.
There is only one over-riding user requirement and that is: can the poor
fellow understand the map?”84 Harrison’s flexible amateurism, in this way,
tweaked the classic American tenet of “common sense” philosophy, a selfconsciously unpretentious construct where truths are made self-evident.85
“Geographical sense” seemed to mean that if one could universally accept
that all maps distort, and that mapmakers are human, then each kind of
unique distortion might actually be useful.86
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In summary, Harrison’s conception of vision and perspective is both
innovative as well as a product of its time. Certainly, Harrison’s notion of
deliberate distortions benefıting the world of cartography did not exactly
catch on, but the notion of a fluid, relational space did. Harrison provides a
complex mediation of this move toward relative space.87 In accentuating
flexibility of perspective, the map itself loses some of its power as a mechanism
of control over the user, yet the audience is still constrained by the limited
choice of perspectives provided by the cartographers.88 Harrison still remains instructive here, because he elevated the power of the user, and thus,
implicitly questioned the natural equilibriums and balances of power that
maps had traditionally highlighted. Relational space depends on how one
looks at the world and the search for a better perception of world space.
Harrison, thus, reminds us through his approach that maps do not necessarily show the world as it is, but more as it could be—the distinctly liberal
notion of modern progress at work.

SITUATING STRATEGY IN HARRISON MAPS
Harrison’s promotion of flexible internationalism on the cartographic page
shifted the focus from which maps were more accurate to which maps were
more dynamic communicators. Highlighting the very techniques by which
audiences can gain new perspectives became a key part of the “display.” And
in these new globalist perspectives, strategy itself became a lens by which to
view the entire world. As Ninkovich has written, “The perception of the
globe’s unity in space and time was crucial, for it obliterated the geographical, cultural, and temporal distinctions that gave life to the historical myth
of old and new worlds,” and thus, there came a need to conceptualize
national interest from the standpoint of unity of global processes, rather
than from the particularist frame of traditional statecraft.89 American liberal strategists during WWII and into the beginnings of the Cold War found
space to be malleable and more universal, but in that new flexibility of
perspective may have come a reductive worldview.
One of Harrison’s most celebrated maps provides a sense of how notions
of “strategy” were changing at this time. For his opening world map in Look
at the World, entitled “One World, One War,” Harrison chose to use the
polar azimuthal equidistant projection, which he referred to as “the darling
of the proponents of the ‘air-age.’”90 The use of the polar center places
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Fig. 5. Richard Edes Harrison, “The World Divided,” Fortune, 1942
(Geography & Map Division, Richard Edes Harrison Collection, Library of
Congress; reprinted with permission from the Estate of Richard Edes
Harrison)

North America in close quarters with North Asia and the U.S.S.R., with the
world shown in one unbroken piece. In the description next to the map,
Harrison entertains the idea that “if the continents were equidistantly
separated . . . almost all areas of the globe would have equal strategic
value.”91 While a greatly distorted projection (Australia on the edges of the
map is stretched beyond recognition), the visual of the polar center has
important ideological connotations, equalizing world power and bringing
the world into a tightly wound collection of landmasses, that, as Harrison
notes, maps “the problems and the opportunities of fıghting all over the
world at once.”92 Thus, “strategy” itself becomes an ideology of being able to
manage such complicated interdependences and being flexible in responses
to aggression in a world that appears much closer than imagined.
A similar map, using a polar azimuthal projection, from Fortune 1941,
illustrates these new continuities of space and proximities in even bolder
relief: the fascinating “World Divided” (fıg. 5) looks almost the same as
“One World, One War,” except for some key differences.93 Here, the large
expanse of the U.S.S.R. is actually colored in pitch-black as an Axis country,
uniting it with Germany, Japan, and Italy. Over the blacked-in country is a
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small caption, suggesting that the reader “count this black if Nazis win a
quick and complete victory.”94 Not only does the projection connote a sense
of dangerous closeness that changes perceptions of strategy, but the use of
color as a bold tool by Harrison brings the immediacy of the situation to the
reader.95 Coloring in one of the largest Allies as a potential Axis conquest
suggests that maps could go outside their conventions of showing world
space “as is” and connote future projections and strategic relationships that
play with both space and temporality.
America’s shift to this image-based internationalism, though, is perhaps
best seen in maps that specifıcally frame America’s interests in terms of the
rest of the world. Harrison’s works capture this shift by simultaneously
highlighting the anxieties and opportunities that are inherent in the perspectives. In the air-age world, interdependences could mean both
strengths and vulnerabilities for American power. In terms of the dangers, a
map like “Three Approaches to the U.S.” in Harrison’s “Atlas for the U.S.
Citizen” shows three perspectives of the United States from Berlin, Tokyo,
and Caracas.96 These maps attempt to show how vulnerable the United
States is from all three locations. While the Berlin and Tokyo maps have
obvious strategic implications for WWII, the inclusion of Caracas highlights
the vulnerability even in our own hemisphere. Once again, the totality of the
presentation is key. Rather than show each of these perspectives in their own
separate maps, Harrison puts each perspective from Berlin, Tokyo, and
Caracas on the same page, one on top of another, as if laying out an
argument. Geography is reduced here to strategy, and vulnerability becomes an integral part of such a strategy—trust no one from any geographical perspective. While many other Harrison maps offer a more proactive
vision of America, putting the American reader inside the map and at the
helm of the action, the “Three Approaches” map looks at America, and the
sense of juxtaposition offers the American audience feelings of vulnerability, lack of control over their “place,” and the sense of being at the mercy of
potential enemies from all directions.
Such a perspective, of course, is reminiscent of the kind of realist fear of
international anarchy that necessitates a balance of power perspective. For
example, Harrison’s maps adorn the pages of early realist geographer Nicholas Spykman’s famous treatise, America’s Strategy in World Politics, which
provides a power-politics plea for world strategy.97 Spykman used air-age
principles to indict American isolationism and to disseminate the idea that
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even in peace, we are unsafe and vulnerable, writing that “a balance of
power . . . is an absolute prerequisite for the independence of the New
World and the power position of the United States. There is no safe defensive position on this side of the oceans. Hemisphere defense is no defense at
all.”98 And arguably, the choice of the polar center in many of Harrison’s
maps highlights this kind of realism. For example, the historiography of
polar geography has tracked how the Arctic became a key piece of “cold war
psychosis.”99 Through the influence of polar maps that connected the
fortunes of the United States and the Soviet Union, the icy wasteland
skyrocketed to political signifıcance, while the potential for international
cooperation in the new proximities of the polar world was stifled by the
culture of Cold War national security.100 In the rush to defend interests, this
new geographic proximity helped to create the conditions for an everwidening ideological distance.
Yet, despite these possible readings and appropriations of his maps,
Harrison’s work is not simply reductive to the naked power of realism, as it
involves a much more global appreciation of how American interests could
be synonymous with world interests. In perspective maps such as “Great
Lakes to Greenland,” for example, we see the air-age perspective of the Great
Lakes and the Northeast United States.101 Just over the horizon, over what
looks like a truncated Atlantic Ocean, Harrison has drawn in the coasts of
Norway, Scotland, Ireland, France, and Spain, bringing Europe into our
normally hemispheric point of view. Also contributing to this change is that
Harrison downplays the rigidity of borders. While there is a line separating
Canada from the United States on the “Great Lakes to Greenland” map, the
eye focuses more on the continuity of the three-dimensional style landscape, and thus, the two countries appear as one mass. Air route lines on the
map track the trajectory from New York through Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and on to Ireland, connecting the interests of the continents and
lessening the impact of the wide Atlantic expanse. In terms of strategy and
ideology, such perspectives place Canada in the forefront of American
interests, as a kind of gateway to other parts of the world, and hence, the
conception of manifest destiny becomes much more global in scope on the
page. Similarly, the map “Puget Sound to Siberia” focuses on the proximity
between Alaska and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. From Harrison’s aerial vantage point, Siberia, and hence, the burgeoning world superpower of the Soviet Union seem almost completely connected to (and
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perhaps encroaching upon) American territory.102 Accompanying this map
is a telling note about strategy:
It is . . . unlikely that Soviet Russia or Japan, indifferently equipped and
operating from far distant sources of supply, should attempt to take the
Pacifıc Northwest as the Germans took Norway. It is far more likely that the
U.S. having taken steps to secure its defense, should one day fınd that it had in
its Aleutian bases a strongly supported big stick with which to influence both
Japanese and Soviet policy.103

Such captions match the visual with both a fear of proximity, in hinting at
Soviet and Japanese presence in our sphere of influence, with an active sense
of duty to spread U.S. might. The old classical realists traditionally saw the
world in terms of nation-state power, but maps like Harrison’s challenge
such notions with their lack of borders—all is connected.
The introduction to Harrison’s “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen,” entitled “The
U.S. and the World” and written by the Fortune editors, is a telling description of how air-age perspectives could mark such a multifaceted internationalism. Predating America’s entry into World War II, the article equates
the new perspective of a shrinking world as a kind of call to arms:
At last, however, the great awakening may be upon us, and we may be
prepared to demand that the realism we love so well in lesser spheres now rule
our thought in the larger spheres where our fate will be determined. Such
realism may show us that we are as unique in the world and as alone as we
were in 1840. But realism cannot end there. For realism does not fulfıll itself in
mere recognition of facts. After recognition, realism leads to action, to a true
change; and when the change has occurred, then the realistic view is different
from what it was before. If, for instance, recognizing our weakness, we
proceed to make ourselves strong, then a realistic view of the world may lead
us to foreign policies that we cannot now consider. . . . And so, facing our
loneliness, we may also recapture our old aggressive spirit. . . . For the atlas,
which these maps make up, is so designed that the citizen of the U.S. may
here, with the whole world before him, begin to make manifest to himself the
outlines of his nation’s destiny.104

Thus, while the word realism is used, its implications are much broader than
maintaining a balance of power: modern internationalism brings forth a
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new manifest destiny that prizes a relational, interpretative vision of world
space—the strategist can remake the world. The classic realist operated out
of an acceptance of weakness and aloneness as a natural condition; here one
can see hints that this loneliness is a construct that can be disputed by using
the right perspective.
In much of Harrison’s WWII work, this new internationalism visually
projects interdependency and cooperation as possible outcomes. The
aerial view of Europe in the “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen” makes this call
for internationalism most poignantly. The map uses Newfoundland as
its vantage point at the center bottom of the map, with England serving
as a center-point (the equator becoming a vertical arc, rather than its
traditional horizontal position).105 Hovering right above England is an
imposing Germany with the gigantic expanse of the U.S.S.R. immediately to the left, its girth stretched all the way off the frame of the map.
Turkey, Syria, and Palestine sit at the top of the sphere, making the
Middle East a strategic location on the horizon. Yet, at the bottom,
Harrison also lists strategically chosen American cities such as Botwood
(NH), New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and Mobile
next to an arrow pointing off the map, once again bringing the affairs of
the Old World into American sights. And as the use of Botwood and
Mobile connote, Harrison was interested in bringing the universal into
the American home. In other words, small cities and towns were just as
“strategic” in disseminating the new air-age geographic information as
were conventional points like New York and Washington, D.C., perhaps
suggesting that we share cultural geographic similarities with other
places in the world that bring us together. As the caption points out,
“Since the Farewell Address of President Washington the U.S. has been
trying to avoid entangling alliances with these foreign countries, and to
live in isolation behind the Atlantic. Yet Europe has been somehow
involved in every major war of the U.S., and 30,000 Americans lie buried
in Flanders.”106 The caption supplements the immediacy drawn into the
lines of the map and an emotional element is added into the calls to
abandon isolationism. How could one be neutral with this type of
perspective? These ideas represent the internationalist view that Europe
is really an American concern, and that U.S. influence in the European
arena must be a function of a common sense perspective.
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Finally, one of the major contributions Harrison makes in visualizing
the global transformation is illustrating how strategy now involves the
spread of communication, economics, and culture, not simply political
and military positions. For example, while the aforementioned gnomonic projection exhibits some of the greatest distortions of any type of
cartographic projection, Harrison praises it as “probably the most accurate map . . . of the communication lines of the modern world, for its
weird stretchings of familiar shore lines are present to achieve one
objective, true great-circle direction. Any straight line on the map is a
great circle and therefore the shortest route between any two points.”107
In his “Great Circle Airways” map, Harrison uses the gnomonic projection with a north polar center to encompass and visually display all the
world’s “great” powers and to represent a large proportion of the world’s
strategic routes of communication.108 The north polar gnomonic thus
captures the interconnectedness (and interdependence) of nation-states
in a wartime context, giving the feeling of mutuality and prizing communication as a new fulcrum of strategy.109
Other maps in Harrison’s archive illustrate the importance of both
industrial and commercial air interests in this new era, evidencing that
the new internationalism was not simply a function of traditional state
power, but also bound in corporations’ powers of transportation. His
1941 Fortune map, “U.S. Air Industry,” shows a freehand sketch of the
United States distorted almost beyond recognition in terms of area and
shape.110 Harrison shrinks or enlarges the size of each state according to
the air power that state has in terms of commercial plants, planes,
engines, and propellers. The bloated-looking shapes of states like Maryland, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Massachusetts, Texas, California, and others suggest an industry almost ballooning and expanding right in front
of the reader and connotes that individual states are implicated in a
global war effort. Thus, in this map, the very technology creating the new
air-age perspective is offered as the subject of the map and frames
America as leading the charge in commercial reign over the skies. With
this approach in mind, it is telling that Harrison was hired to create a
world map for Pan Am in 1946: a Harrison-style globe is rendered in
blue-gray with criss-crossing deep red spider-like lines all over the map,
showing the airline’s routes across the entire globe.111 In a post-war map
such as this one, the reader sees the American global transport of air
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weaponry being replaced by the transport of American capital. Such a
point is a poignant demonstration of the complexities of the burgeoning
air-age internationalism, as visualized in cartography: the spread of
ideas and soft power, carried by technologies like the airplane, and later
satellites, becomes infused into notions of global space. The form of the
map’s aerial perspective connotes a sense of rolling, inevitable movement above space—a mediation of the new movement of capital, technologies, and ideas that came out of the shift to liberal American
globalism at midcentury.

CONCLUSION
The whole body of Harrison’s WWII maps shows that the immense
power of transportation in a world of new proximities could certainly
bring empire-thirsty armies against the United States, but answers that it
is the transcendent power of American “perspective” that can transform
world space. There is a certain irony in the fact that Harrison bemoaned
what he called the “too-long-forgotten realities of world geography,”
while his novel perspectives were part of the kind of abstraction that
liberal modernism needed—the air-age detachment of seeing the earth
unfold from the standpoint of one’s own particular interests.112 The
realities of world geography were, then, in fact shapeable, according to
the sheer variety of perspectives and relationships that Harrison offered.
It is no wonder, then, that in addition to his popular contributions to
journalistic cartography, he was also appropriated as a technical consultant to the State Department throughout WWII and the early Cold
War—policymakers’ interests in those fresh, bird’s-eye view perspectives showed a new flexibility and sensitivity to public opinion in the U.S.
government’s approach to spatial problems on a global scale.113 As S. W.
Boggs, the offıcial Geographer of the Department of State, wrote to
Harrison in 1941 about their collaboration on a new map of world
transport problems: “I would be delighted to have your ideas. . . . In
making maps which really get across to the man on the street, and to the
busy statesman or executive, perhaps [your] radically different shadings
would result in making maps so characteristic that they would attract
attention and be easily distinguishable from the run-of-the-mill products of the present.”114
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Of course, despite Harrison’s pursuit of a “realistic” picture of the
world, he seemed more than aware of the ironic conundrums cartographers face in making necessary distortions. For example, his archive
reveals a diary containing the makings of an unfınished book he was
writing from the early 1940s called The World is Round-O!, and it speaks
to his recognition of the discursive nature of cartography. Harrison
writes: “this book is subtitled a treatise on maps, but it is really about the
skin of a spherical object and man’s painful efforts to take the hide off the
sphere and spread it flat so that the pattern of it still remains recognizable. . . . When the attempt is made to show the entire surface of the
globe on one sheet of paper, the cartographer’s dilemma is completely
revealed. It is like trying to wrap a grapefruit without wrinkling the
paper, or like commissioning a portrait painter to do a head showing not
only the face but the sides, back and top simultaneously.”115 He goes on
to compare this approach to a Dali painting, thus showing his acknowledgment of cartographic abstraction.
The potential problem, though, is that in the process of abstraction,
maps become metaphors for the space itself. As Prelli has demonstrated
in his study of scientifıc maps as forensic evidence, metaphors are often
visually literalized on the graphic page, but also can be de-literalized as
well.116 By reminding viewers of the discursivity of maps through his
dramatic emphasis on form, Harrison takes the map out of its traditional
role as an impartial display of states and geographic information, in a
sense “de-literalizing” the old classic metaphor that the “map is the
territory.” Yet, still, the power of the new map becomes reifıed in the
sense that all is now strategic and malleable, with Harrison’s perspectives and projections showing new vulnerabilities, strengths, and proximities. Without the traditional borders and orientations that we expect
from maps, Harrison simplifıes the globe in a new way, a kind of
reductionism that encourages a common-sense liberal interpretation of
American interests as commensurate with all points on the map. The
dynamic of Prelli’s revealing and concealing is on display, with Harrison
caught in the tension between textualizing the world and revealing its
artifıce versus concealing the map’s construction and making it a naturalized instrument of liberal modernist foreign policy and strategy.
Cartography during WWII was part of a larger, distinctly modern internationalism that had been taking root for decades, the implications of which
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found their way into the very visualization of American power and global
strategy as more fluid and relational. If one defınes visual culture as the
“historically situated beliefs about vision and images that influence audiences’ practices of looking,” then Harrison’s novel take on vision was a
complex and fascinating entry into such a culture.117 His maps highlighted
the perspective of vision, the means of the map, as being just as important as
the content of the map itself, reminding us that perception and interpretation are a key part of how global space is transformed.
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